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ABSTRACT
Differential power analysis attacks are special kinds of side-channel attacks where
power traces are considered as the side-channel information to launch the attack.
These attacks are threatening and significant security issues for modern cryptographic
devices such as smart cards, and Point of Sale (POS) machines; because after careful
analysis of the power traces, the attacker can break any secured encryption algorithm
and can steal sensitive information.
In our work, we study differential power analysis attacks using two popular neural
networks: Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN). Our work seeks to answer three research questions(RQs):
RQ1: Is it possible to predict the unknown cryptographic algorithm using neural
network models from different datasets?
RQ2: Is it possible to map the key value for the specific plaintext-ciphertext pair
with or without side-band information?
RQ3: Using similar hyper-parameters, can we evaluate the performance of two
neural network models (CNN vs. RNN)?
In answering these questions, we have worked with two different datasets: one is a
physical dataset (DPA contest v1 dataset), and the other one is a simulated dataset
(toggle count quantity) from Verilog HDL. We have evaluated the efficiency of CNN
and RNN models in predicting the unknown cryptographic algorithms of the device
under attack. We have mapped to 56 bits key for a specific plaintext-ciphertext
pair with and without using side-band information. Finally, we have evaluated
vi
our neural network models using different metrics such as accuracy, loss, baselines,
epochs, speed of operation, memory space consumed, and so on. We have shown the
performance comparison between RNN and CNN on different datasets. We have done
three experiments and shown our results on these three experiments. The first two
experiments have shown the advantages of choosing CNN over RNN while working
with side-channel datasets. In the third experiment, we have compared two RNN
models on the same datasets but different dimensions of the datasets.
vii
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Security in our lives is important, for our private information too. Cyberattacks, data
breaching, illegal intrusion etc. are making our life hazardous and awful. More and
more research should be done to cope with changes of exchanging information and to
protect us from outsiders.
In this era, industries, businesses, and the general population generate, share,
and exchange information as a form of data. These data values may reside in a
computer, or a server or the cloud. Communication between two computers or two
persons needs a secure channel, as people want their information to be secured and
private. Securing communication, with different cryptographic implementations being
used all over the world, is a matter of concern that information is being leaked by
cyber-attackers. The main goal of these attackers is to break any security and to
recover sensitive and private information that is supposed to be hidden, such as the
passwords of individuals, credit card information, and device keys used for encryption
or decryption. The problem does not rely on cryptographic algorithms. Instead, it
relies on the cryptographic implementations of the devices or the systems. Side-
channel attacks are the most popular kinds that attackers conduct to recover secret
information from a device or a system without gaining full access to it. As the name
suggests, side-channel attacks exploit side-channel leakage in the form of noise, the
2power consumption of a device, the behaviors of the registers, and so on. After getting
any of these side-channel leakage information, the attackers search for methods to
conduct the attack into the implementations of the device.
Side-channel attacks are alarming for this world because every walk of our lives
depends on the usage of technology and sharing information to it. Nowadays, our
information is preserved in the cloud, and we have no idea about the security of this
information. We all want our information to be private and safe. Manufacturers
of electronic devices come forward to make their products secure from side-channel
attacks. Security experts and cryptologists are trying to come up with a solution
to prevent these types of attacks on cryptographic implementations or devices to
protect an individuals private information from leaking or being abused. This field
of research is not only of academic interest but also manufacturers of cryptographic
devices demand it, because there have been many examples of attacks on real-world
cryptographic devices such as the bit-stream encryption in Xilinx FPGAs [1], the
KeeLoq remote entry system [2], the YubiKey multi-factor authentication token [3],
Mifare DESFire contactless payment cards [4], etc. These attacks made the manu-
facturers of these cryptographic devices and security experts aware of them.
We find very much interest in this area of research because there are lots of
things to be done in this field of study. In our work, we have focused on differential
power analysis attacks, which are the most popular form of side-channel attacks. In
this work, we have used deep learning techniques to conduct our research on power
consumption datasets, which are collected from cryptographic devices. As we know,
deep learning is an advanced technique which is so efficient at learning by example.
We have selected two popular models of deep learning neural networks. One is the
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and the other one is the Recurrent Neural
3Network (RNN). The short description of CNN and RNN models are given in the
terminologies chapter.
The reason behind choosing these two models of deep learning techniques are:
• The characteristics of the datasets e.g., time series
• The volume of the datasets. RNN and CNN networks can handle large volumes
of datasets efficiently.
• RNN and CNN, both work well with sequential data having various lengths.
• We want some predictive result from our datasets.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The main goal of this thesis work is to study side-channel attacks, especially dif-
ferential power analysis attacks in a device which is using cryptographic algorithms
implementation. Using deep learning techniques, we are interested in evaluating the
performance of our neural network models in predicting the power traces (power
consumption values) patterns to identify the known cryptographic algorithms such
as Data Encryption Standard (DES). We know that DES algorithms have 16 rounds,
so we want our models to predict the DES rounds and to differentiate datasets from
non-DES. Moreover, after predicting the DES rounds and also classifying into DES
and non-DES, we design our neural network models to guess on the keys. We have
used the RNN model to recover the keys.
To research side-channel attacks, we answer the following important research
questions (RQs):
4RQ1: As an attacker, analyzing the datasets and feeding into the neural network,
is it possible to detect which encryption algorithm the device is using?
RQ2: Is it possible to get the keys from the neural network model for a given
plaintext-ciphertext pair?
RQ3: Using similar hyper-parameters, can we evaluate the performance of two
neural network models (CNN vs. RNN)?
1.2 Our Major Contributions
In answering the above research questions, we have built two neural network models
(CNN and RNN) to detect the underlying cryptographic algorithm of the device under
attack. We have shown the comparison of the performance of these two networks.
Our goal is to detect the underlying cryptographic algorithm that the target device
is using and predict the keys for the encryption/decryption.
In our thesis work, we have several contributions.
• Comparison between CNN and RNN models on DPA contest Dataset: We have
compared our two neural network models to predict the DES rounds from the
power traces. Our datasets are DPA contest datasets in both cases. We are very
interested in comparing two models using various performance metrics such as
accuracy, speed, memory occupied, and loss of the models.
• Comparison between CNN and RNN models on Toggle Count Quantity Dataset:
We have compared our models on toggle count quantity dataset. Using these
toggle count values, we are interested to see how well the model performs. We
also consider the same metrics that we use for DPA contest dataset.
5• Comparison between CNN and RNN models in classifying the DES and non-
DES algorithms: We have developed two network models (RNN and CNN) for
binary classification of two classes: DES and non-DES. We want to evaluate
the performance of each of the network models to see how well they can classify
the two classes of cryptographic algorithms.
• Comparison between key mapping with and without toggle count quantity
values: Using the RNN model, we compare the performance of key mapping with
toggle count values and without toggle count values. For the first RNN model,
our inputs are 64bit plaintext, 64 bits ciphertext, and one bit for encryption
or decryption. We expect the output to be mapped with a specific key for a
specific plaintext-ciphertext pair. For the other one, our inputs to the model
are 64 bits plaintext, 64 bits ciphertext, one bit for encryption or decryption,
and toggle count values. In each case, we are mapping our input to 56 bit key
values. We evaluate the performance of each of the models using metrics such
as the accuracy of the model, loss of the model, speed of execution.
For key detection for a given plaintext-ciphertext pair value, we have showed how
accurately we can detect the key values.
1.3 Outline
The paper is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the background of the thesis work. In this chapter, we briefly
describe the basic preliminaries or terminologies of Side-Channel Attack types, Data
Encryption Standard (DES) algorithms, Basics of Digital Signal Processing (DSP),
Deep learning techniques etc.
6Chapter 3 discusses the related work in this field, and how our work is different
from other work.
Chapter 4 broadly describes our methodologies of the thesis work.
Chapter 5 summarizes this thesis work with a conclusion section and possible
direction for future studies.
7CHAPTER 2
TERMINOLOGIES
2.1 Side-Channel Attack
Side-channel attacks can be defined as an attack where an attacker can gain sensitive
information from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem. So, we can say
that side-channel analysis is a branch of cryptography where information can be
gained from the implementation of a electronic system, rather than the flaws in the
cryptographic algorithms used. In this attack, attackers can gain information by
exploiting the various sources such as timing information, power consumption, sound
of the device, and electromagnetic leaks. There are many classes of side-channel
attacks like cache attacks, electromagnetic attacks, timing attacks, software imple-
mentation attacks etc. Figure 2.1 shows the basic diagram of a side-channel attack in a
cryptosystem. The attacker has generally no idea about the cryptographic algorithms
used in the system or device, but getting ideas about the physical implementations,
the attacker gains valuable information about the target.
In our thesis work, we work on power analysis attacks, which is one of the very
special classes of side channel attacks. We discuss the power analysis attack in the
next section.
8Figure 2.1: A typical diagram of Side Channel Attack
2.2 Power Analysis Attack
Power analysis attack is a class of side-channel attacks where an attacker uses the
power consumption of the device or the system as the leaked information to ex-
ploit the target device or the system. The idea is that when the execution of
a cryptographic algorithm (DES, AES, RSA etc.) on an electronic device occurs,
then the device will consume power with a specific signature. The computation of
the cryptographic algorithms takes a considerable amount of power. The attacker
measures the power consumption of the device during the computation execution.
These power consummations are then stored in a computer as power traces to do
deeper analysis. The attacker tries all possible ways to retrieve information about
the secret key in the algorithm from the captured power traces. After careful analysis
using various methodologies, the attacker becomes successful in identifying all the
sensitive information about the cryptosystem, as well as the devices key.
From Figure 2.2, we see the setup of a typical power analysis attack. Power
analysis attacks usually consist of a target device under attack, a digital oscilloscope
and a personal computer. The attacker hooks up an oscilloscope to the target
9device using probes. This target device is essentially executing one of the encryption
schemes and running some kind of cryptosystem. The attacker measures and captures
the power consumption of the target device at a determined sample rate. They
get the collection of points which contains the voltage level measurements. Each
of these measurements is called a power trace. These collection of power traces
are stored into a personal computer. Using popular data processing applications
(Python, MATLAB,etc), the attacker can analyze and process the collected power
traces. The good thing is that the attacker does not to have any knowledge about
the cryptographic algorithm being used by the target device. He/she only needs to
make educated guesses and properly analyze the power traces to learn about the
cryptosystem perfectly so that he/she can be able to conduct an attack.
Figure 2.2: A depiction of Power Analysis Attack
Power analysis attacks are of different types such as simple power analysis (SPA),
template-based analysis, differential power analysis (DPA) and horizontal power anal-
ysis (HPA). We discuss briefly to introduce two important types to the reader.
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2.2.1 Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
SPA is the basic form of side-channel power analysis attack. In this attack, the
attacker will observe and analyse one or more power traces and will try to get all
possible information and reasoning of these traces. The attacker also tries to get
information about the target system or the target device. Then, using the gathered
information, he/she can be able to determine all the operations which are executed
by the target device. Finally, he/she can be able to determine the cryptographic key.
Figure 2.3 shows the single power trace of an encryption algorithm. We can see
the pattern of the dataset.
Figure 2.3: A single power trace of DES algorithm [19]
SPA is the technique to determine the knowledge about the target system and the
secret key directly by analyzing one or a few power traces.
2.2.2 Differential Power Analysis Attack (DPA)
A DPA attack is also known as a non-profiled attack. Non-profiled attacks occur in
closed devices such as smart cards of financial institutions, where an attacker does
not have full control of the device. Hence, he/she can have a limited number of
side-channel power traces of a cryptographic operation with a fixed unknown secret
11
key value. In this attack, the attacker can have the following information from the
device under attack:
1. A fixed secret key k where k belongs to a key space.
2. Random inputs/ Message
3. Random outputs/ Cipher-text
The attacker collects the side-channel traces and then combines all of this infor-
mation to do mathematical analysis or key hypotheses using various well-known data
analysis tools or algorithms to infer information to get the key.
In our thesis work, we will be working with differential power analysis attacks.
We have our two datasets: one is physical data and the other is simulation data.
Figure 2.4 shows the basic structure of a differential power analysis attack in a
cryptographic device.
In our dataset, we have closed device information that means side-channel traces
that have fixed unknown keys, known messages, and known ciphertext.We analyze the
traces and using two very well-known neural network techniques (RNN and CNN),
we predict the pattern of the information to guess about the algorithm. We map the
message-ciphertext pair with a specific key value in the key space.
2.3 Deep Learning Techniques
Deep learning is a very popular technique for machine learning algorithms. In deep
learning, a model can learn by example and can imitate a human brain to get efficiency
in doing or achieving something. Recent examples of deep learning are driver-less cars
[20], digital image processing, pattern recognition, face recognition etc.
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Figure 2.4: Differential Power Analysis Attack overview
In this section, we talk about deep learning neural networks. We have applied two
neural networks (RNN and CNN) in our work.
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2.3.1 Artificial Neural Network
An artificial neural network (ANN) is a network of artificial neurons. It is a structure
where at least one input layer and one output layer should be presented. This input-
output layer makes a neural network. Typically, there are other layers, named as
hidden layers that may be present. When all the neurons of a neural network are
connected to each other, we call it a fully connected neural network. There are basic
terms to know to understand a neural network.
• Neuron: A neuron is a basic unit of the neural network. It takes input and
multiplies the input by a specific weight and then adds bias values. After that,
it passes the result through an activation function.
• Activation Function: Each neuron has an activation function. This function
helps the neural network to achieve non-linearity. Having non-linearity, a model
can create complex mappings of the data or can operate on complex input
data such as videos, speech, and electrical signals. There are different types of
activation functions. We have used four activation functions such as Sigmoid,
TanH (Hyperbolic Tangent), ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit), and Softmax in our
study.
• Epoch: An epoch is defined as a measure of the number of times we will pass
our training input vectors through the learning algorithm or the model. In our
work, we see that when we use fewer number of epochs, we achieve unexpected
results due to under-fitting. So, we try to limit our epochs to 50-100 times. In
each epoch, the weights are being updated and providing us better and better
results. Input data values are passed forward and backward through the model
in each epoch.
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• Gradient Descent: Gradient descent algorithms are used to train the neural
network by updating the weights [14]. In each iteration, using backpropagation,
we calculate the derivative of the loss function with respect to each weight.
Then, we subtract it from the weights. In this way, we update the weight
values and train the model step by step.
• Learning Rate: Learning rate is a method to overcome the problem of overfitting
in neural network model training. When we use gradient descent algorithms,
our weights are updated, but the weights will change too far and will lead
the model to overfit the training data. At the time of backpropagation, if we
multiply learning rate with the derivative from of the gradient descent and then
subtract it from the weights, we will get good results. We use learning rate
value 0.02. In our work, keeping learning rate 0.02, we get good results when
we train our model.
• Optimization Algorithm: These algorithms perform the gradient descent. While
updating the weights and passing through the cost function or activation func-
tions each time we calculate the error (actual data - predicted data). Our
goal is to minimize the error. Optimization functions work to minimize the
error by changing the parameters of the gradient descent of the neural network
model. The most commonly used optimization algorithms are Adam, Adagrad,
RMSprop, AdaMax, Nadam etc. In our work, we use Adam optimization
algorithms, as we get more accurate results using it.
Figure 2.5 shows a structure of a typical neural network where there is one input
layer and one output layer. There is no hidden layer.
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Figure 2.5: A simple Artificial Neural Network Structure
2.3.2 Convolution Neural Network (CNN)
Convolutional neural networks (CNN), or convNet in other terms, are very popular
and widely used in image processing, analyzing images, data analysis and classifying
different problems [13]. What makes CNN more unique than other neural network
models is that it has convolutional layers instead of having typical hidden layers.
These convolutional layers transform the input data to the model and pass it through
the next convolutional layers. These transformation operations are called convolution
operations. The assumption that a CNN model makes about the input is: the input
are images and it encodes the properties from these inputs.
Each convolutional layer uses a series of filters or kernels to detect features in our
intended images or patterns. These filters are n-dimensional arrays. The convolution
operations make use of these kernels or filters. The filters are overlaid on the input
data values and calculate the product of the filter and the input data to pass the
output to the next neuron in the neural network. The output of the convolution
operations are stored in an n-dimensioanl array called a feature map or an activation
map. The more filters we apply, the more features we can detect and extract from
the input data. This is the basic idea of how CNN works using convolutional layers
16
to detect features from images.
When our data volume is large, such as when we have many images, then the
operation of the convolution layers will be very time-consuming. In that case, we can
apply pooling layers for convolution operation by reducing the number of parameters.
Different pooling layers we can use are max pooling, average pooling and sum pooling.
Figure 2.6 demonstrates the operation of a CNN network. This figure is collected
from paper [15].
Figure 2.6: Overview of Convolutional Neural Network Operation
2.3.3 Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
A recurrent neural network is a type of neural network model that was proposed in the
80s to model time series or to make use of sequential information. Why is this model
so popular today? The answer is straightforward: for bigger data volume and bigger
computation, RNN achieves a higher accuracy than machine learning techniques [12].
This network is called recurrent because, for every element of a sequence, it
performs the same task where the output is dependent on the previous computations.
The difference between the RNNs and CNNs is that any RNN-LSTM (long-short
term memory) has a memory through which it can capture the information about
what has been calculated so far.
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A Recurrent neural network has a state and it basically receives input (input
vectors) through time so that at every single time step we can feed an input vector
into the network and it has some state internally and then it can modify that state
as a function of what it receives at every single time step. There are synaptic weights
inside the RNN which refer to the amplitude or strength of a connection between two
nodes in a neural network layer. When we tune those weights, the RNN will have
different behavior in terms of how its state evolves as it receives these inputs.
The formula for an RNN is:
ht = fw(ht−1 + xt)
Here, Ht is the new state and Ht-1is the old state and Xt is the input vector as
some time step t. Fw is denoted as a fixed function with weights (w) parameters.
The working procedure of an RNN model is generally the following:
• First, we provide input (input matrix) to the network (input could be anything).
• This input will be multiplied by the weight matrix and will also add a bias
value.
• Then, this will pass through an activation function to activate the result of
that layer and the result or output will feed into the next layer. The activation
functions can be a sigmoid, tanH or reLu (rectifier linear unit). Actually, the
output of the hidden layers is the result of a dot product operation and followed
by a bias value. Bias values in a neural network are used to make a node in a
layer always on. Bias values are set to 1 regardless of the data in a given pattern.
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Backpropagation works by calculating gradients (multi-variable generalization of
the derivative), which are needed in the calculation of the weights in a neural network.
Every time, an RNN model goes through this process until it predicts the actual target
output. If an error occurs in predicting, then we usually do back-propagation [10] to
solve the error.
2.3.4 Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) Network
These are the special types of neural networks which can solve the limitation of
recurrent neural networks (RNNs). A typical RNN network faces difficulties in
resolving the long-term dependencies in the input sequence. Using LSTMs, we can
easily solve this problem because an LSTM network has capability to memorize the
previous input for a long period of time. LSTM can learn long-term dependencies.
This feature makes the LSTMs very useful when we want our RNN model to work
with language modeling or text sequence processing.
A typical RNN has a chain-like, repeating structure. LSTMs also have this
structure, but instead of having a single network layer, it utilizes four gate-like
layers. These gates are very useful for avoiding vanishing gradient problems. These
gates store information of backpropagation for future use and resolves long term
dependencies.
2.3.5 Keras
Keras [16] is a library written in Python for high-level neural networks. It supports
CPU and GPU acceleration libraries and enables a neural network model for fast
prototyping. Using Keras, one can easily understand the structure of the model and
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build a model within a short period of time. Keras is compatible with Python version
3.6. We are using Keras version 2.2.4.
2.3.6 Tensorflow
Tensorflow [17] is a very useful framework for backends in a neural network. It is
an open source platform for machine learning and deep learning network models. It
enables us to easily build a model, to use complex machine learning functions, and
to conduct powerful experiments for research.
2.3.7 Data Encryption Standard
Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a symmetric-key algorithm, which means it uses
the same cryptographic key for encrypting a plaintext and decrypting a ciphertext.
It is known as the block cipher and it operates on 64 bits messages. DES algorithms
need a secret key of size 64 bits, where only 56 bits are used in encryption/ decryption
and 8 bits reserved for parity. The DES algorithm for encryption or decryption works
in the following way:
• First, 64 bits plaintext is run through an initial permutation (IP). After that,
64 bits messages break into two 32 bits halves.
• These two 32 bits halves will go through a Feistel network for 16 rounds.
• In the end, the final permutation will be done on the message, which is the
inverse of the initial permutation of the plaintext.
• Finally, we will get ciphertext of 64 bits as the output.
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Figure 2.7: A pictorial view of DES algorithm
Figure 2.7 shows the big picture of the DES algorithm execution. We use DES
algorithm in our work for side-channel data analysis, comparing the datasets with
different neural network models.
2.3.8 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
AES is another type of symmetric encryption algorithm and much faster than triple
DES. Like DES, AES also can be called a block cipher. It operates on 128 bits data
and uses 128-256 bits keys.
AES works in an iterative manner not like a Feistel cipher. It actually accomplishes
its computations on bytes rather than bits. Thats why plaintext messages of 128 bits
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block will be 16 bytes for AES and they are arranged in a 4x4 matrix format. The
number of rounds in AES is not fixed. For example, 128 bits keys are needed for 10
rounds, 192 bits keys for 12 rounds and 256 bits keys for 14 rounds.
A typical encryption process is given in the Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: A pictorial view of AES algorithm
The decryption process of the AES algorithm is just the reverse operation of the
encryption process. Nowadays, AES is used widely in both hardware and software.
So, we use AES data values while doing binary classification of DES and non-DES.
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2.4 The DPA Contest Dataset
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) contest [18] is a website where security researchers
and students from different parts of the world participate to publish their attack
modules in side-channel attack space. In this way, it is also a great source of publicly
available datasets the people who are interested in working with differential power
analysis attacks.
2.4.1 DPA Contest V1: DES Dataset
It is a contest organized and maintained by VLSI research group in France. This
contest used data encryption standard (DES) to research DPA. We have collected
the DES power traces from the DPA contest v1. We use the datasets in our thesis
work to compare between CNN and RNN models.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
Recently, side-channel attacks have received much attention from researchers and
security experts around the world. They use different methods of breaking ciphers
to develop countermeasures, and after that they provide some ideas to strengthen
them. Some of the researchers use deep learning models to perform side-channel
attacks. Most of them used convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to demonstrate
their attacks and to present efficiency of the attacks.
Samiotis et al. [6] covered a variety of classification scenarios to study CNN’s
performance on side-channel data. They examined the performance of CNN’s on
four different datasets of side-channel data and then compared their models with
conventional machine learning (ML) algorithms and a CNN model from the literature.
In our work, we have worked with CNN and RNN models. We have shown the
difference between these two models in respect to performance and accuracy.
Maghrebi, Portigliatti, Prouff et al. [7] studied the application of deep learning
techniques in the context of side-channel attacks for the first time. To evaluate
their proposed attacks, they compared them to the most commonly used template
attacks and machine learning attacks. They conducted their attacks on three different
data-sets by evaluating the number of traces required. Finally, they showed their
attacks outperform the state-of-art profiling side-channel attacks. We have studied
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side-channel attacks using two different datasets. In the future, we will enhance our
research by conducting our research with more datasets.
Picek et al. [8] considered several scenarios for profiled Side-Channel Analysis
(SCA) and compared the performance of several machine learning algorithms. They
also suggested that if someone conducts profiled SCA, he should use convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) for good results. However, we have shown that one can find
an RNN model by changing hyper-parameters which will outperform the CNN model.
Kim, Picek, Heuser, Hanjalic, et al. [9] designed a CNN model with which they are
able to achieve high performance with the random delay countermeasure. They sug-
gested adding noise in the side-channel analysis evaluation while using deep learning
techniques. We work with recurrent neural networks (RNNs) as we learned that for
time series and sequential data, RNNs are the best fit [10]. So, we will evaluate our
results to compare with other work that was done using CNNs or machine learning
techniques.
Moreover, some of the researchers have applied machine learning (ML) techniques
to leak information from unprotected and protected cryptographic implementations.
Most of them focus on two popular methods, such as Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and Random Forest (RF). Hospodar, Gierlichs, De Mulder, Verbauwhede et al. [11]
studied the application of machine learning in the side-channel analysis. They focused
on power analysis where power traces leak meaningful amounts of information about
the processed cryptographic key. They also used LS-SVM as their classification
technique. We have used two popular neural networks (CNN and RNN) to study
power-analysis attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
We have worked with CNN and RNN models and applied these to two different
datasets to compare the performance of the two models. We have evaluated our RNN
model performance in predicting the DES rounds in DES algorithms. After predicting
and getting an idea about the cryptographic algorithm, we have applied deep learning
techniques (neural networks) to get information about the keys. We divide our work
into three deep learning experiments and describe each of the experiments in this
chapter.
4.1 Big Picture of the Thesis Work
We have done four comparisons: RNN vs. CNN on DPA contest datasets, RNN
vs. CNN on toggle count quantity datasets, RNN vs. CNN on binary classification
and RNN vs RNN on mapping keys. These comparisons are described as three deep
learning experiments here.
Figure 4.1 shows the big picture of our work. We describe shortly each of these
tasks in the later sections.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the hierarchical pattern of the thesis work
4.2 Datasets
We have worked with two datasets: publicly available datasets from DPA contest v1
and Simulated Toggle Count datasets from Verilog. We will be working on Physical
Datasets from an FPGA board in our future work.
4.2.1 Dataset Structure
First we will talk about our datasets pattern, how we preprocess them, and how we
prepare them for our model.
27
Table 4.1: Power Traces values are shown in the table
Power Traces 0.015917 0.015416 0.01739 0.01903 0.019447
Time 9.55E-07 9.55E-07 9.55E-07 9.55E-07 9.55E-07
The above table shows a few values of the power traces out of 50,000 traces.
Here, we are only interested in the power traces values, and we will show how we
preprocessed these values for the model to work.
The characteristics of data-sets are:
• The data-values are time-series data.
• Power trace values are the power consumed by the operation.
• After extracting the files from the DPA Contest v1 data-sets, we get thousands
of CSV files containing power traces for a particular message, key, and ciphertext
pairs.
• We have extracted the CSV files by running a C-program code that was given
on the DPA contest website.
• Each CSV file has two columns: one is for time and the other is for power
consumption value. The time here is not significant, as we are only interested
in power traces, not in which time it was sampled.
The datasets we have used for our work are all time-series data. That means that
all our series data points are sampled successively at equally spaced points in time.
The sequences of the data points are related to the time it was sampled.
1. DPA Contest v1 Dataset: These are contained power traces values which are
measured by an acquisition platform. These traces are collected and stored
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by and belongs to Telecom ParisTech. The power consumption traces data
stored in ‘.bin’ format. They have also provided a C-program file named as
‘agilent bin reader.c’ to convert ‘.bin’ file into a ‘.csv’ file.
DPA Contest V1 Dataset
Filename Total Traces Count File Size
secmatv1 2006 04 0809.zip 81,089 4 Gbytes
secmatv3 20070924 des.zip 81,569 1 Gbytes
secmatv3 20071219 des.zip 67,753 6 Gbytes
Table 4.2: Information of DPA Contest Dataset
Power consumption traces are presented in the datasets as voltage. The voltages
are in nanovolts (nV 1e−9 ) units.
2. Simulated Dataset: We worked with simulated datasets from Verilog. These
datasets files contained time and toggle count. Dataset information is based on
specific plain-text, cipher-text pairs and also their corresponding keys.
Toggle Count Quantity Dataset
Filename Total Traces
Count
File Size
0 key message ciphertext.csv 49 5 KB
1 key message ciphertext.csv 49 5 KB
0 key message ciphertext.csv 49 5 KB
1 key message ciphertext.csv 49 5 KB
0 key message ciphertext.csv 49 5 KB
Table 4.3: Toggle Count Datasets from Verilog
In these datasets, filename is composed of encryption or decryption (0 or 1),
Plain-text, Cipher-text, Keys. The contents of the files are time and toggle
count data. In Table 4.1, the structure of the datasets is shown.
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3. Experimental Dataset: These datasets are collected from the Artix-7 FPGA
board. The evaluation kit of Artix-7 has single and double differential I/O
standards.
4.2.2 Dataset Cleaning (Munging) and Visualization
In this section, we will talk about the data cleaning process of our three datasets.
Our datasets contain noisy data values, irrelevant data points, etc. So, our target is
to clean our datasets before we will proceed training and validating these in neural
networks.
For cleaning the datasets, we have applied digital signal processing concepts. The
methods we used are Hamming, Hanning window functions.
The following figures show the effect of using digital signal processing methods in
our side-channel DPA contest datasets.
Figure 4.2: Initial condition Figure 4.3: After Cleaning
After applying Hamming, Hanning window functions we get Figure 4.4 of DPA
contest datasets. In the figure, the x-axis represents the power traces in voltage and
the y-axis represents the time. We see that most of the noise has reduced and the
leakage of the datasets are visible.
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Figure 4.4: DPA contest dataset after applying windowing functions
We need not apply the digital signal processing methods to the toggle count
datasets because they are simulated data values from Verilog HDL. The following
Figure 4.5 shows the toggle count datasets patterns. From the figure, we see that
when there is a change found in the data, it shows a high spike.
Figure 4.5: The toggle count dataset pattern
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4.3 Deep Learning Experiments
We have done three different deep learning experiments with DPA contest and toggle
count datasets. We have used CNN and RNN as our deep learning techniques.
1. Experiment 1: In this experiment, we show the comparison of RNN and CNN
models in prediction DES rounds from DPA contest and toggle count datasets.
We measure the loss and accuracy of the two models. We evaluate the speed of
the execution of these two models while processing the same amount of datasets.
2. Experiment 2: Here, we classify our datasets into two classes: DES and non-
DES. Doing so, we use RNN and CNN models. We evaluate the performance
of these two models and perform the comparison.
3. Experiment 3: In the last experiment, we evaluate the performance of two RNN
models in mapping the specific key for a plaintext-ciphertext pair based on with
or without side-band information.
4.4 Experiment 1: Prediction of DES rounds
We know that the DES algorithm operates with 16 rounds for encryption and decryp-
tion. In this section, we discuss the prediction of DES rounds using deep learning
techniques. We have predicted the DES rounds with both CNN and RNN models.
We predict DES rounds on DPA Contest and toggle count datasets. Finally, we
compare the model and model accuracy between CNN and RNN models. Again, we
are repeating that our main goal is not to get higher accuracy using an RNN model
rather than a CNN model. We are interested in how well our RNN model works, and
we try to get the accuracy closer to the CNN model.
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Here we consider that the attacker has only power traces. With only the power
traces of a cryptographic device, how can he/she be able to predict the DES rounds
and gain some knowledge about the cryptographic algorithms?
4.4.1 RNN Model to Predict on DPA Contest Data
We have developed a recurrent neural network model to predict the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) rounds. First, we consider 1000 samples of the data to see how it
can predict the subsequent rounds and what it looks like.
Figure 4.6 shows the DES rounds prediction on DPA contest datasets with only
1000 traces. The x-axis represents the number of traces and the y-axis represents the
values of the trace.
Figure 4.6: DES rounds prediction with 1000 traces
Then we predict the DES rounds with 5000 traces. Here, we split the dataset 67%
for training and 33% for validation and test purposes. We found that the attacker
can get an idea about the algorithm through a thorough analysis of the signals.
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Figure 4.8 shows the DES rounds prediction on DPA contest datasets with only
5000 traces. The x-axis represents the number of traces and y-axis represents the
values of the trace.
Figure 4.7: DES rounds prediction with 5000 traces
Finally, we operate our model on 50,000 trace values to have some idea about the
patterns of the datasets and also predict the DES rounds. In doing so, we split our
datasets in our RNN model, 67% for training and 33% for testing. We will show our
model accuracy and loss in the subsequent subsections.
Figure 4.8 shows the DES rounds prediction on DPA contest datasets with only
5000 traces. The x-axis represents the number of traces and y-axis represents the
values of the trace.
4.4.2 RNN model on Toggle Count Datasets
We have applied our RNN model to predict the subsequent rounds in the toggle count
datasets based on the toggle quantity and time. As these datasets are time series, we
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Figure 4.8: DES rounds prediction with 50000 traces
can easily apply the RNN model on these datasets to predict future values or more
patterns.
Figure 4.9 shows the DES rounds prediction on DPA contest datasets with only
5000 traces. The x-axis represents the number of traces and the y-axis represents the
values of the trace.
Figure 4.9: DES rounds prediction with 350 sets of Toggle Count traces
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4.4.3 Baselines
We compare the RNN and CNN models’ performance using several metrics such as
baseline, number of epochs, speed of execution, accuracy and loss of the model.
Here, we do not classify our datasets into different classes, so the random baseline
will be 100% based on the definition. According to random baseline definition, all
our 50,000 key, ciphertext and plaintext values are unique and random.
On the other hand, our most-common baseline will be 0% because we do not have
common key, ciphertext and plaintext values.
4.4.4 Result: Accuracy and Loss Evaluation in Predicting
In this section, we discuss the evaluation of the RNN model on the prediction of
DES rounds of both DPA contest dataset and toggle count datasets. We show a
comparison of value loss between and RNN and CNN models. We make the same
prediction with CNN models. We observe CNN and RNN model accuracy and loss
in predicting the subsequent DES rounds.
RNN Model Accuracy on Toggle Quantity Count Datasets
In this subsection, we show the accuracy and loss that we achieved after running our
RNN model on toggle quantity count datasets.
Figure 4.10 shows the DES rounds prediction accuracy of our RNN model on the
toggle quantity datasets. The x-axis represents the number of epochs and the y-axis
represents the accuracy in percentage.
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Figure 4.10: RNN Model Accuracy on Toggle Quantity Count Dataset
In Figure 4.10, we can easily see that while training the model it achieves almost
82.5% accuracy. For testing over the rest of the datasets, it achieves almost 80%
accuracy. We have run our model up to 100 epochs.
RNN Model Loss on Toggle Quantity Count Datasets
Here, we show the loss of the model in predicting the DES rounds in the toggle
quantity count datasets.
Figure 4.11 shows the DES rounds prediction loss of the RNN model on the toggle
Quantity datasets. The x-axis represents the number of epochs and y-axis represents
the loss in percentage.
From Figure 4.11 we can easily see that while training and testing the datasets,
the loss is decreasing depending on the number of epochs of the neural network model.
At the time of training, the loss of the model falls sharply. While testing the datasets,
the loss decreases frequently.
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Figure 4.11: RNN Model Loss on Toggle Quantity Count Dataset
RNN Model Accuracy on DPA Contest Dataset
In this subsection, we show the accuracy and loss that we achieved after running our
RNN model on DPA contest datasets.
Figure 4.12 shows the DES rounds prediction accuracy of our RNN model on
the DPA contest dataset. The x-axis represents the number of epochs and y-axis
represents the accuracy in percentage.
From Figure 4.12 we can easily see that while training the model it achieves
almost 78% accuracy. For testing over the rest of the datasets, it achieves almost
76% accuracy. We have run our model up-to 30 epochs. We have run our model for
DPA contest dataset up-to 30 epochs in order to make simple and save computation
time.
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Figure 4.12: RNN model accuracy on DPA Contest Dataset
RNN model loss on DPA contest Dataset
Here, we show the loss of the model in predicting the DES rounds in the DPA contest
datasets.
Figure 4.14 shows the DES rounds prediction loss of RNN model on the DPA
contest datasets. The x-axis represents the number of epochs and y-axis represents
the loss in percentage.
Figure 4.13: RNN model loss on DPA Contest Dataset
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From Figure 4.14 we can easily see that while training and testing the datasets,
the loss is decreasing depending on the number of epochs of the neural network model.
After 30 epochs, we see the value loss reduces to less than 47.5% for each training
and testing of the model.
Comparison of RNN and CNN model loss
Here, we discuss the efficiency of the RNN model and CNN model in predicting the
DES rounds with both toggle count datasets and DPA contest datasets.
Figure 4.14 shows the DES rounds prediction loss of the CNN model on the
toggle Quantity datasets. The x-axis represents the number of epochs and the y-axis
represents the loss in percentage.
Figure 4.14: CNN model loss on DPA Contest Dataset
From Figure 4.14 we can easily see that while training and testing the datasets,
the loss is decreasing depending on the number of epochs of the neural network model.
After 6 epochs, we see the value loss remains constant up-to 50 epochs. The loss of
the model is about 4%. In this case, it is better than our RNN model performance.
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Here, we see better accuracy and less loss during training and testing of the CNN
model, because CNNs can deal with misaligned traces, as proposed in [5].
While in our RNN model, we have used the LSTM network, whose next hidden
layer output mainly depends on what it sees in previous layers.
4.4.5 Discussion
We run 50 epochs for our RNN and CNN models. For each epoch it takes 1 second for
our CNN model and 2 seconds for our RNN model. So, we can say the CNN model’s
execution has better speed than the RNN model for predicting the DES rounds.
Figure 4.15 shows the comparison between the performance of our RNN and CNN
models.From the figure, we see that the CNN model performs better than the RNN
model in predicting DES rounds.
Figure 4.15: RNN and CNN model performance comparison
Table 4.4 represents the comparison of the CNN and RNN models in predicting
DES rounds with toggle quantity count and DPA contest datasets.
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Result Comparison I
Model Speed (Time per
epoch)
Training Accu-
racy
Validation Accu-
racy
Loss
CNN 51 seconds 98% 95% 4%
RNN 100 seconds 82% 78% 38%
Table 4.4: Comparison of CNN & RNN on different matrices
4.5 Experiment 2: Classification of Two Classes: DES and
Non-DES
In this section, we discuss the classification of DES and non-DES classes using the
side-channel datasets. Here, we assumed that the attacker is powerful enough to
get the plaintext, ciphertext, and key values for specific plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Now, the attacker will get the traces from other cryptographic devices, and he is
interested in classifying his/her datasets into DES and non-DES classes using deep
learning techniques. We have chosen the RNN model and LSTM network to classify
the datasets into two classes: DES and non-DES.
4.5.1 Procedure of the Experiment
Here, we have 68,000 DES datasets and 55,000 non-DES datasets (AES datasets).
The main goal is to classify the datasets into two classes. For AES datasets we want
our model to label it as 0, which means non-DES. And for DES datasets the label
will be one (1), which means it is a DES dataset.
We have split our datasets into 60% for training and 40% for validation. Our
plaintext, ciphertext, and keys are in text format. So, using the embedding layer, we
have converted the text into vectors for computation into the neural network.
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Figure 4.16 shows the structure of the recurrent neural network for completing
the binary classification task.
Figure 4.16: Structure of the RNN model for Classification
The task is a binary classification task. We have used binary crossentrophy as our
loss functions and Adam optimizer as optimization functions. Here, we are interested
in the accuracy metrics. We have found almost 86.51% accuracy in classifying DES
and non-DES classes using our RNN model for binary classification. We have labeled
the datasets based on the feature that DES contains 16 characters hexadecimal values
in plaintext, ciphertext, and keys. The idea is if the length of the plaintext or
ciphertext is equal to 16, we labeled it as 1, which means DES, and 0 otherwise.
Binary classification accuracy for classifying the two classes: DES and non-DES is
good in this case.
4.5.2 Baselines
We consider two baselines: random and most common baselines of our datasets. The
metrics that we consider while comparing the two models’ performance are: speed of
execution, loss and accuracy of the models for a fixed number of epochs etc.
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• Random Baseline: The random baseline in this case is 50% because we are using
two classes: DES and non-DES. For DES, the model will classify it as 1 and for
Non-DES (AES), the model will classify it as 0.
• Most Common Baseline: For the classification task, we have 68,000 DES datasets
and 55,000 non-DES (AES) datasets. The most common baselines is 55.28%.
For most common baselines, we have divided 68,000 DES datasets with the
total 123,000 datasets.
4.5.3 Result Comparison of RNN and CNN in Classifying Two Classes
We have done the binary classification using the CNN and RNN model to check
the performance between the two models. We have measured the model accuracy
and model loss for the two models and showed which model performs well for the
binary classifying task. The comparison of these two models is shown in the following
sections.
RNN Model Accuracy and Loss
We use the same hyper-parameters for two models to compare the performance. We
use LSTM network, ‘sigmoid’ as activation function, ‘rmsprop’ as optimizer, and
‘binary crossentrophy’ as loss function. We measure the accuracy for the model in
both training and validation cases.
According to Figure 4.17, the accuracy of the model is 86.51%. That means it can
classify the DES data values from the other (AES) data values with good accuracy.
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Figure 4.17: Accuracy of the RNN model for Classification
On the other hand, the model has loss as well. The loss of the model has a zigzag
fall. It maintains a constant value at 18.23%. We can see the loss of the model in
Figure 4.18 for both the training and validation cases.
Figure 4.18: Loss of the RNN model for Classification
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CNN Model Accuracy and Loss
We keep the hyper-parameters the same for performance evaluation. For the CNN
model, we have better accuracy than the RNN model. The CNN model works good
in classification tasks.
Figure 4.19: Accuracy of the CNN model for Classification
We have almost 90% accuracy for the CNN model in classifying the DES and
Non-DES data values. Figure 4.19 shows the accuracy of the CNN model.
The loss of the CNN model is shown in Figure 4.20. The loss of the model tends
toward 10%.
We have the loss for the models in both cases: training and validation. Training
loss gives us the information about error occurred during training.
4.5.4 Discussion
Our CNN model outperforms the RNN model in classifying DES and non-DES classes.
Figure 4.21 shows the accuracy curve of the two models which proves that CNN
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Figure 4.20: Loss of the CNN model for Classification
performs well. We present the information in tabular form also.
Figure 4.21: Performance comparison of CNN and RNN
The following table 4.5 represents the performance comparison between the CNN
and RNN models at a glance.
From the table, we can get the idea of the accuracy and loss of the two models
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Result Comparison II
Model Speed (Time per
epoch)
Training Accu-
racy
Validation Accu-
racy
Loss
CNN 110 seconds 89.9% 89.5% 10%
RNN 132 seconds 87% 85.6% 38%
Table 4.5: Comparison of CNN & RNN on Binary Classification
and the speed of the execution. It takes time for both of the models because of large
training and validation datasets. We get better accuracy for the CNN model in the
binary classification. An attacker can utilize the neural network model and can guess
the algorithm used in the system. This will lead the attacker to attack the device or
system with less effort.
4.6 Experiment 3: Recurrent Neural Network Model for
Mapping Keys
In this section, we use the RNN model to get the key values for a specific plaintext-
ciphertext pair.
We show two different works: in the first one, we input plaintext, ciphertext and
encryption/decryption bits (0/1) to the neural network. The output of the neural
network model will map to the exact key for a specific plaintext-ciphertext pair.
For the next one we input plaintext, ciphertext, side-band information (toggle
count quantity) and encryption/decryption bit (0/1) to the neural network and the
output we expect keys mapped in 56 bits key-space.
After that, we evaluate the performance of key mapping with side-band and
without side-band.
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4.6.1 Procedure of the Experiment
Key Mapping without Side-band Information
We first build an RNN model which will take three inputs: plaintext, ciphertext
and one bit encryption or decryption key. Plaintext and ciphertext are in 16 byte
hexadecimal form. The working procedure of the RNN model can be summarized
below:
• First, we convert the data from hexadecimal to binary values. So, we have 64
bits binary plaintext, 64 bits ciphertext and one bit encryption/decryption key.
The input of the network is 129 bits binary values.
• Then we simply think about the multi-class logistic regression model of machine
learning where if you input two or multiple elements, it will be mapped with
the respective third element. So, we have used softmax in the final layer. As
we know, softmax generates the probabilities for a specific input to the specific
output.
• Here, we want our model to map with exact key values for a specific plaintext-
ciphertext pair.
• Final model output is 56 bits key for a plaintext-ciphertext pair.
Figure 4.22 shows the logical flow of the task for key mapping without side-band.
Here, side-band information means the toggle count quantity information that we get
from Verilog HDL simulation. For the next key mapper RNN model, we use side-band
information along with the other inputs.
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Figure 4.22: Structure of the RNN model for mapping keys without side-band
Key Mapping with Side-band information
In this key mapping task, we use the same methodology for getting a key value for
a specific plaintext-ciphertext pair. The difference is in the input parameters. Here,
our inputs to the model are plaintext, ciphertext, encryption/decryption key, and
side-band information (toggle count quantity data values). The reason behind using
side-band information as the extra input parameter in the RNN model is that we are
interested to see if it is possible to achieve better accuracy or to get better result than
without having side-band information in the input. The work procedure is as follows:
• Like the previous task, we have converted our plaintext, ciphertext from hex-
adecimal to binary values. With one bit encryption/ decryption key, we have 129
bits binary input to the neural network model. Additionally, we have side-band
information along with these inputs.
• In the same manner, we use softmax before the output layer. Softmax gives us
probabilities for multi-class regression. For a specific plaintext-ciphertext pair
and having additional information, the model mapped with a key value from
the key-space.
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• The output of the model is 56 bits key for the specific inputs.
Figure 4.23 shows the structure of the inputs and output of the RNN model to
map the key values with using side-band information.
Figure 4.23: Structure of the RNN model for mapping keys with side-band
4.6.2 Baselines or Metrics
The metrics that we use in this experiment to evaluate the performance of two RNN
models are: speed of the execution, loss and accuracy of the models for a specified
number of epochs, and memory required to store the model etc.
Our datasets for this experiment are generated from python DES programs. In
that programs, each time we generate random sets of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and
also a specific key for the pairs.
• Random Baseline: The random baseline in this case is 100% because our
ciphertext-plaintext pairs are randomly generated and also the key for these
pairs are randomly generated.
• Most Common Baseline: For the classification task, we have 76,000 DES datasets.
The most common baselines is 0%, because all the pairs of ciphertext-plaintext
are random.
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4.6.3 Performance Evaluation of RNN Model with and without Side-
band Information
The key-mapping task is done by using recurrent neural network (RNN) only. We
have not tested it with convolutional neural network (CNN). So, the performance of
the RNN model will be evaluated for the two different cases. For the first case, we
will evaluate the RNN model performance without side-band information. And for
the second case, we will use side-band information for key-mapping.
Evaluation of Model Accuracy and Loss without Side-band
We have evaluated the RNN model accuracy for the training and validation datasets.
From Figure 4.24, we can see that the accuracy of the RNN model is almost 79%.
Figure 4.24: Accuracy of the RNN model for mapping keys without side-band
We have evaluated the loss of the model for the training and validation datasets.
Figure 4.25 shows the loss of the model. We can see that the loss of the model
maintains a constant loss value at 23% after a zigzag decrease.
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Figure 4.25: Loss of the RNN model for mapping keys without side-band
Evaluation of Model Accuracy and Loss with Side-Band
We expected the better accuracy of the RNN model while we have additional infor-
mation such as side-band information. We have achieved better accuracy, as was our
expectation.
Figure 4.26 shows the accuracy of the model after using the side-band information
with our datasets.The accuracy of the model is almost 87.3% in this case. So, we got
better accuracy with side-band information.
The loss of the model was less in this case than the loss without side-band
information. From Figure 4.27, we can see that the loss of the model is 19%.
4.6.4 Discussion
We have run our RNN model for 50 epochs. For the first case, it takes 2.5 seconds
per epoch. And for the second case, it takes 3.2 seconds per epoch.
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Figure 4.26: Accuracy of the RNN model for mapping keys with side-band
Figure 4.27: Loss of the RNN model for Mapping Keys with Side-band
Figure 4.28 shows the comparative performance of two RNN models in mapping
the keys for ciphertext-plaintext pairs. We can see that the RNN model which use
side-band information achieves better accuracy than the other RNN model. It is
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clear that using more information makes the models extract more features from the
datasets and to achieve better results.
Figure 4.28: Comparison of two RNN models
From Table 4.6, we can see the relative difference between the performance of
RNN models without and with side-band information.
Result Comparison III
Model Speed (Time per
epoch)
Training Accu-
racy
Validation Accu-
racy
Loss
RNN1 125 seconds 78% 79% 23%
RNN2 160 seconds 87% 87.3% 19%
Table 4.6: Comparison of RNN & RNN on Key Mapping
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this section, we will discuss the summary of our work and also suggest some
directions for possible future work.
5.1 Overview of Our Work and Contributions
In our thesis work, we have studied side-channel attacks using deep learning techniques-
more specifically, with two popular neural networks (CNN and RNN). We have
discussed and pointed out that side-channel attacks are a real threat for the security
and privacy of the devices and computing systems we use every day. We have shown
how an attacker can extract valuable information from the computing devices like
smart card readers, IoT devices, micro-controllers etc. using deep learning techniques.
We have evaluated the performance of our models in predicting the DES rounds
from the DPA contest dataset and toggle quantity count dataset. Using CNN and
RNN models, we have showed how an attacker can detect the underlying algorithm
from the datasets by simple classification. We have evaluated the performance of
the two models in classifying between DES and Non-DES algorithms using various
performance metrics. Finally, we have showed how an attacker can map key value for
a specific plaintext-ciphertext pair. We showed that by using additional information
(side-band), an attacker can get good accuracy in mapping keys.
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5.2 Directions of Future Work
We have faced some challenges while working in this area of research.
1. Handling large datasets, we faced problems. Our machine became slow while
processing these large datasets. We have used DPA contest V1 datasets and
simulated toggle quantity datasets.
2. Processing the datasets to remove NULL or empty field. It took time and space
to process large datasets.
3. Converting the input datasets into appropriate formats for applying the deep
learning model.
4. We don’t have adequate prior knowledge about deep learning techniques because
we did not take any courses on them.
5. We couldn’t build an automated process or scripts to find an exact neural
network model by changing the hyper-parameters.
To address these, we worked hard and learned about deep learning techniques. We
tried to complete our work with the resources that we already have. In the future,
to process large datasets, we will occupy a server machine with high configuration.
We will generate physical data from Artix-7 board and will conduct research. We
will build a neural network model that will be very effective and will achieve higher
accuracy.
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APPENDIX A
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CORRELATION POWER ANALYSIS (CPA)
A.1 Overview
CPA is an attack that uses statistical analysis techniques and mathematical cor-
relations, e.g. Pearson correlation coefficient. First, an intermediate small subkey
is selected from the plaintext and part of the key. Then, the power consumption
is hypothetically calculated for each essential subkey based on a power model (e.g.
hamming weight model) for each plaintext sample. The Pearson correlation coefficient
is calculated between the hypothetical power consumption values and the real power
values measured. The key with the highest correlation with the measured trace is
selected as the correct key guess.
CPA can be prevented by increasing the noise or decreasing the signal sizes,
inserting timing variations, data masking, computing the inverse operations, changing
the order of the computer operations by shuﬄing
A.2 Key Guess using Python Program
#!/usr/bin/env python
import sys
class CPA():
sboxTable = ( 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01,0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76,
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0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2,
0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64,
)
def __init__(self):
pass
def Sbox(self, inp):
return self.sboxTable[inp]
pass
def HammingWeight(self, num, ret=0):
count = 0
while num >= 1:
if num%2 > 0:
count+=1
num /= 2
if ret == 0:
return 6 - count
else:
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return count
def HammingDistance(self, num1, num2):
return self.HammingWeight(num1^num2)
A.3 Recurrent Neural Network
RNN has different models:
• One to One: Takes one input and generates only one output, e.g. image
classification.
• One to Many: Takes one input and generates a sequence of multiple steps, e.g.
image captioning.
• Many to One: Takes a sequence of multiple steps as input and generates only
one output, e.g. sentiment analysis.
• Many to Many: Takes a sequence of multiple steps as input and generates a
sequence of words, e.g. language translations.
In this thesis work , we are using the many to one model where we are feeding
the sequence of multiple toggle quantities of the power consumption from the Verilog
HDL simulator into the RNN model and trying to achieve a single output if it is the
desired encryption algorithm or not, and we are mapping many to many model to
reverse engineer the encryption algorithm using the simulated toggle data.
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APPENDIX B
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POWER MEASUREMENT SETUP FOR XILINX ARTIX-7
BOARD
B.1 Overview
A post-silicon dataset refers to the dataset collected from the hardware implementa-
tion in actual devices at real-time.
This dataset was acquired by measuring the power consumption via probes from
the Cmod A7 DIP form development board built around a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA,
which is considered the cryptographic device containing the code of the S-AES algo-
rithm. Figure B.1 shows a Cmod A7 development board.
Figure B.1: Experimental Setup for Collecting Physical Dataset
